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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-129(1 )(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), this matter was assigned to the
Utah Court of Appeals, by Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated July 5, 2007,
and effective July 25, 2007.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As to factual findings, upon appeal from a contempt citation, contemnor
has burden of demonstrating that, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court, the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial court's findings.
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988).
As to legal conclusions and rules of procedures, errors are questions of
law which the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Brown v. Glover. 16
P.3d 540, 544 (Utah 2000); N.A.R.. Inc. v. Walker. 37 P.3d 1068, 1069 (Utah
App. 2001).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 64D(e)(4) Interrogatories.
The plaintiff shall submit with the affidavit or application interrogatories to
the garnishee inquiring: ...whether the garnishee is deducting a liquidated
amount in satisfaction of a claim against he plaintiff or the defendant, a
designation as to whom the claim relates, and the amount deducted.
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II.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 64D(g) Garnishee's
responsibilities.

The writ shall direct the garnishee to complete the following within seven
business days of service of the writ upon the garnishee: (g)(1) answer the
interrogatories under oath or affirmation; (g)(2) serve the answers on the plaintiff;
(g)(3) serve the writ, answers, notice of exemptions and two copies of the reply
form upon the defendant and any other person shown by the records of the
garnishee to have an interest in the property; and (g)(4) file the answers with the
clerk of the court. The garnishee may amend answers to interrogatories to
correct errors or to reflect a change in circumstances by serving and filing the
amended answers in the same manner as the original answers.
III.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 64D(j)(2) Liability of garnishee.

If the garnishee fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the
court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and show cause why the
garnishee should not be ordered to pay such amounts as are just, including the
value of the property or the balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the
garnishee's failure. If the garnishee shows that the steps taken to secure the
property were reasonable, the court may excuse the garnishee's liability in whole
or in part.
IV.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure - Rule 24(a)(9)

...A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state
the request explicitly and set for the legal basis for such an award.
STATEMENT
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case is a legal dispute over improperly asserted bank offset rights and
penalties for contempt of a district court order. This matter deals with the efforts
of Bud Bailey Construction, the judgment creditor and Appellee herein, to garnish
the bank deposit account of Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall, the
judgment debtor; the repeated failure by Cache Valley Bank, the bank where the
iv

deposit account of the judgment debtor was located and the Appellant herein, to
comply with a garnishment order of the district court; and the award granted to
the Appellee by the district court for contempt of a valid garnishment order.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

Following a default judgment, Appellee filed a writ of garnishment to collect
monies owed. Appellant answered the garnishment interrogatories indicating it
had $17,910.94, but failed to claim an offset for any funds owed to the Appellant.
Appellant failed to remit monies identified in their answers to garnishment
interrogatories. The district court issued an Order to Show Cause in re contempt.
Following three evidentiary hearings to allow Appellant to produce evidence that
it had not violated Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D, the district court found Appellant in
contempt of the order of the district court. For its contempt, the district court
ordered that Appellant pay the balance of the judgment pursuant to Rule
64DQ')(2) plus attorney fees and costs incurred by Appellee.
III.

DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT.

By an Order dated May 9, 2008, the district court found, among other
things, that: 1) Appellant failed to claim an offset in its answers to interrogatories
or at any other relevant time as required by law; 2) circumvented a valid
judgment and valid garnishment with an alleged de-facto receivership; 3) was in
contempt of a valid garnishment and order; and 4) as a penalty for the contempt
was ordered to pay the remaining judgment amount together with attorney fees
and costs incurred by Appellee. R. 234-243.
v

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about April 3, 2006, the district court entered default judgment in the

amount of $46,919.79 against Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall
("judgment debtor") in favor of the Appellee. R. 72-74.
2.

On or about April 14, 2006, Appellee filed with the district court an

application for writ of garnishment in the judgment amount of $46,919.79. R. 7577.
3.

On or about April 14, 2006, the district court issued a writ of garnishment to

Appellant R. 83-85.
4.

On or about April 24, 2006, Appellant was served with the writ of

garnishment. R. 82.
5.

On or about April 27, 2006, Appellant filed with the district court

garnishee's answers to interrogatories for property and other earnings. In its
answers to interrogatories Appellant acknowledged $8,150.08 being present in
the account of the judgment debtor. Appellant in response to interrogatory 3
claimed no offsets or deductions. R. 78-81.
6.

On or about May 18, 2006, Appellant remitted the amount of $8,150.08 to

the Appellee.
7.

On or about October 19, 2006, Appellee filed with the district court a

another application for writ of garnishment in the judgment amount of $46,919.79
with $38,769.71 still owing. R. 98-100.
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8.

On or about October 19, 2006, the district court issued a writ of

garnishment to Appellant in the judgment amount of $46,919.79 with $38,769.71
still unpaid. R. 83-85.
9.

On or about November 1, 2006, Appellant was served with the writ of

garnishment. R. 105.
10.

On or about November 8, 2006, Appellant filed with the district court

garnishee's answers to interrogatories for property and other earnings. In its
answers to interrogatories Appellant acknowledged $17,901.94 being present
from the account of the judgment debtor. In response to interrogatory three
Appellant claimed no offsets or deductions. R. 101-104.
11.

On or about January 25, 2007, the district court issued a Garnishee Order

to Show Cause in re contempt ordering the Appellant to appear before the district
court on February 12, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. to show cause: 1) why Appellant should
not be ordered to appear before the district court to explain its failure to obey the
order of the district court; 2) why Appellant should not be held in contempt for its
failure to release the amount garnished; 3) why Appellant should not be ordered
to pay the amount that has been garnished from the judgment debtor's account;
4) why Appellee should not be awarded its attorneys fees and costs for having to
bring this order to show cause; and 5) why Appellee should not be awarded such
further relief as the district court deems just and equitable under the
circumstances. R. 120-121.
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12.

On or about February 12, 2007, the district court heard arguments on the

order to show cause in re contempt. Counsel for Appellant failed to appear and
was contacted by the district court via phone. The district court set an additional
hearing for February 26, 2007. The district court granted attorney fees to
Appellee. R. 133-134.
13.

On or about February 26, 2007, the day of the hearing, Appellant filed with

the district court a response to garnishment and order to show cause in re
contempt. R. 135-158.
14.

On or about February 26, 2007, the district court again heard arguments

on the order to show cause in re contempt. At the hearing, Appellant requested
an additional evidentiary hearing to provide more evidence to the district court.
The district court granted the Appellant's requests and set a third hearing for April
2, 2007. The district court again granted attorney fees to Appellee. R. 159-160.
15.

On or about March 13, 2007, Appellant filed with the district court a

supplemental memorandum in support of it's response to garnishment and order
to show cause in re contempt. In the supplemental memorandum, Appellant
asserted that after it had answered the writ and remitted the [first] garnishment
amount, the bank exercised the remedy to offset amounts owed to the bank by
commencing a de-facto receivership to monitor and control the bank accounts of
the judgment debtor. R. 161-170.
16.

On or about March 13, 2007, in support of its supplemental memorandum,

Appellant filed with the district court an affidavit of garnishee. In the affidavit of
viii

the bank president, Appellant asserted it had disregarded the order of the district
court, by exercising the remedy to offset amounts owed to the bank by "more or
less operating a de-facto receivership." R. 171-180.
17.

On or about March 27, 2007, Appellee filed with the district court its reply

memorandum in opposition. In its reply, Appellee argued that: 1) the actions of
the Appellant where wholly inconsistent with exercising a right to offset; 2) the
Appellant failed to timely assert the right to offset in its answers to garnishment
interrogatories as required by Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D(g); and 3) it be granted
its attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D(j)(2) for
garnishee's failure to comply with Rule 64D, the writ and the order of the district
court. R. 181-201.
18.

On or about April 2, 2007, Appellant filed with the district court a further

supplemental exhibit for supplemental memorandum in support of its response to
garnishment and order to show cause in re contempt, in an attempt to show its
rights to offset. R. 202-232.
19.

On or about April 2, 2007, the district court held a third hearing heard on

the order to show cause in re contempt. Following the third hearing, Appellant
again requested a further hearing to provide additional evidence of its right to
disregard the order of the district court under a power of de-facto receivership.
The district court denied the request for a fourth hearing and ordered Appellee to
prepare the findings of fact and order for the hearing. The district court again
granted attorney fees to Appellee. R. 233.
ix

20.

At the third evidentiary hearing held on or about April 2, 2007, the district

court found that Appellant allowed 27 checks to clear through the bank account
of the judgment debtor to pay other parties in the amount of $42,412.48 after
Appellant had received the garnishment. R. 272, page 2 at 1J9-11, 16-17.
21.

The Order of the district court was entered on May 9, 2008. In the Order

the Court found, among other things, that: 1) Appellant failed to provide an offset
in its answers to interrogatories or at any other relevant time as required by law;
2) circumvented a valid judgment and valid garnishment with a de-facto
receivership; 3) was in contempt; and 4) as a penalty was ordered to pay the
remaining garnishment amount together with attorney fees and costs. R. 234243.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly found that Appellant did not properly offset the
debts of the judgment debtor but instead ignored a valid garnishment and valid
court order by permitting the judgment debtor to operate its account to pay third
parties - performing these actions under the authority of a self created de-facto
receivership. By these actions the Appellant was properly found to be in
contempt of a valid garnishment and valid court order and, therefore required to
pay Appellee the balance of the judgment plus attorney fees and costs pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 64D.

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN ON APPEAL AND
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE DISTRICT COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT.
Upon appeal from a contempt citation, contemnor has the burden of

demonstrating that, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial court's findings. Utah Farm
Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988). Additionally,
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a party
challenging a fact finding "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Though many overly zealous advocates may be tempted to
read this requirement less than literally, the reported cases clearly indicate that
the courts are serious about enforcing the requirement under its express terms.
The Utah Court of Appeals has set forth the requirement as follows:
[t]he marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge
the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The marshaling requirement is a procedural mechanism that is designed to
protect the trial court's fact-finding prerogative and to promote the efficiency and
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quality of an appellate court's review. Under the terms of the rule, a party who is
challenging a trial court's finding of fact is required to include a listing of all pieces
of evidence that support the trial court's finding in the argument section of the
opening brief.
Appellant has failed to meet this burden and failed to comply with the
marshaling requirements of Utah R. App. P. Rule 24 As a result, the Court
should reject Appellants' arguments and affirm the findings by the district court
that 1) the bank [Appellant] failed to provide an offset as required by law; 2) the
bank was not in compliance with the garnishment statute as required under Rule
64; 3) the bank was in contempt of the order court; and 4) as a result the bank
was ordered to pay the balance of the judgment - all should be affirmed. R. 272,
page 22 at IP 9-25, page 24 at IP-3.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY
THE BALANCE OF THE JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE FOR ITS FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH RULE 64D OF THE UTAH R. CIV. P. AND FOR ITS
CONTEMPT OF THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
It was apparent from the evidence submitted to the district court that

Appellant failed to exercise any rights to offset and violated the rule [Utah R. Civ.
P. Rule 64D], the writ and the order of the district court. As a result, the district
court properly ordered, pursuant to the Rule 64DG)(2), that Appellant pay the
balance of the judgment to Appellee for its failure to comply with Rule 64D, the
writ and the order of the court.

2

A.

Right to Offset

Appellant argues in its opening brief that the district court erred by not
recognizing the legal right of offset. The Appellant is in error on this point and
has misunderstood the three previous evidentiary hearings, the record of the
district court, its prior filings at the district court and the affidavit of its own Bank
President.
Three steps must be taken to maintain an offset. There must first be an
intent and decision to exercise the right to offset, a subsequent action which
completes the offset, and finally a record which verifies that the action has been
taken. See United Seeks, Inc. v. Eagle Green Corp.. 389 N.W. 2d 571 (Neb.
1986); Baker v. National City Bank of Cleveland. 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975).
A mere declaration of intent to offset retrospectively does not establish a setoff.
In re Archer, 34 B.R. 28 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
Appellant failed to meet any of the requirements for maintaining a right to
offset but instead claimed retrospectively that it in principle had asserted a right
to offset when served with the writ of garnishment by starting a de-facto
receivership. The district court found that the actions of the Appellant where
inconsistent with an actual proper offset.
The district court thoroughly considered the arguments of the Appellant by
providing three evidentiary hearings to allow Appellant to present evidence that it
properly exercised an offset. To illustrate proof of an offset, the Appellant
claimed retrospectively that it in principle had asserted a right to setoff when
3

served with the writ of garnishment by starting a de-facto receivership so as to
not technically take the money of the judgment debtor by offsetting but rather
allowing the judgment debtor to operate its account and pay Appellant at a later
date.
When the Appellant was questioned by the district court about what power
or authority it had to operate a de-facto receivership, Appellant submitted the
Affidavit of Bank President Gregg Miller, which stated in pertinent part that:
In light of the perceived insolvency of the Third-Party Defendants,
and their probable inability to repay outstanding loan obligations,
Bank management began operation of, more or less, a
receivership to allow deposits to be made into the bank
accounts, with Bank management control over all
disbursements made from the accounts." R. 172 at U 4.
Throughout the de-facto receivership, the Bank has only
allowed certain disbursements to be made that would allow
Third-Party Defendant to continue business operations in a way
that would allow for the repayment of loans to the Bank." R. 172
atH5.
Further, in an attempt to clarify the retrospectively claimed right to offset
the bank stated in pertinent part that:
...the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling how they're spend
in furtherance of its own interest. If the bank is entitled to all of those
funds and if they release funds so they can be paid more in the
future, that to me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority
to keep all the funds and control it for themselves and pay off debts.
R. 272, page 7 at ff20-25 and page 8 at fl1-2.
Despite three evidentiary hearings, the Appellant was unable to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the district court that a de-facto receivership
was allowed under the security agreements signed by the judgment debtor or
4

that a de-facto receivership existed under the any law, contract, banking
regulation, code provision or the UCC. In fact, the district court's comments on
the Appellants failure to provide evidentiary support are instructive:
No, there is no place in the security agreement that it says it can
have a de-facto receivership. What it does is it says it can seize the
account and it lists the items that it can seize and take control of
those items and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute
itself for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say,
"You know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going to
allow your claim. I'm going to move your claim ahead of this claim
because I think that's in my interest to move your claim ahead of my
claim." I mean, they're taking on a role there that I think is really
unique under the law and I don't think it's allowed, that's what I'm
trying to ask. R. 272, page 6 at H24-25, page 7 at 1J1-10.
...when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the money
on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another party to receive
a debt they have against this party and it appears to me that the
bank with this de-facto receivership is deciding as against a court
order that these people have the right to receive the funds ahead of
themselves, the bank, because they're not taking the funds for
themselves. I understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're
closing down this account, we're taking the money to offset, we think
there's a danger they're not going to pay and they exercise that. I
don't have any problem with doing that as I read the documents but I
don't understand how they can allow themselves in this defecto
receivership to go against a court order and say these other people
have a right to get the money instead of us, the bank, and instead of
the garnishee, I mean the person that garnished. R. 272, page 2 at
1f18-25, page 3 at 1|1-8.
Next, contrary to the assertions of the Appellant in its opening brief, the
district court found that although Appellant may have had a right to offset, it failed
to properly exercise that right. The district court found in pertinent part that:
...they [Appellant] made a determination that instead of taking
the money for themselves, they wanted the money to go to
other parties to pay their debts and move these other parties'
5

debts in front of a valid judgment with a garnishment filed.
They decided, we can do that. And I don't think in the law they can
do that. There is no where in the law I think they can do that
because that's not an offset. They're not offsetting. They're
allowing somebody else to get the money instead of
themselves. R. 272 at page 20, lines 1-19.
... the bank with this de-facto receivership is deciding as against a
court order that these people [third-parties] have the right to
receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank, because
they're not taking the funds for themselves, I understood if they
said, okay, we want an offset, we're closing down this account, we're
taking the money to offset, we think there's a danger they're not
going to pay and they exercise that. I don't have a problem with
doing that.... R. 272 at page 2, lines 18-25 and page 3, lines 1-8.
... the bank has the right to take it off their debts, to offset their
loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that. That's
the difficulty that I have. That's not what they did. They allowed
it to be paid to other parties other than themselves...they
decided that could do this in this de-facto receivership and
that's what I'm saying, that's where I really have problems with the
law because there's nothing in the law that I'm aware of that allows
them to do that. R. 272 at page 6, lines 6-16.
The district court was very clear in finding that the Appellant had the right
to offset but that Appellant failed to exercise that right. From the three
evidentiary hearings, the evidence showed that Appellant not only failed to
exercise the right to offset in its actions but also failed to assert the defense of
offset in its answers to garnishment interrogatories as required by Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 64D.
Appellant at all relevant times had the opportunity and privilege under Rule
64D(g) to amend its answers to the garnishment interrogatories to properly claim
any rights to offset. Appellant failed to exercise that privilege. Notwithstanding,
6

even if Appellant had requested to amend its answers and had been permitted to
amend its answers to garnishment interrogatories to claim any rights to offset,
the district court found that the actions of the Appellant failed to demonstrate an
offset.
As a result, in its order the district court properly held that Appellant had
failed to claim an offset in its answers to garnishment interrogatories or at any
other relevant time by amending its answers to interrogatories as provided by
Rule64D(g). R. 249.
The Appellants argument that it has a right to offset which was not
recognized by the district court is not correct. It is clear from the record that
rather than exercise a right to offset Appellant instead managed disbursements
from the account under a self-proclaimed de-facto receivership. It is apparent
from the record that the district court found that Appellant had a security interest
and had a right to offset funds when it received the garnishment but chose not to
protect itself by failing to assert a right to offset by its actions or by asserting the
same in its answer to garnishment interrogatories.
B.

Scope of Garnishment

Appellant argues in its opening brief that the district court erred when it
ordered it to pay the balance of the judgment not for violation of Rule 64D or for
contempt of the court's order but rather on the basis of a continuing garnishment
and a superior security interest. The Appellant is in error on this point and has
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misunderstood the three previous evidentiary hearings, the record of the district
court and the affidavit of its own Bank President.
Contrary to the assertions of the Appellant, the district court did not find
that Appellee had a "superior" or "higher security interest" from that of the
Appellant. Instead the district court found that Appellee had a security interest
superior to the third-parties which Appellant allowed the judgment debtor to pay
over $42,000.00 ahead of the Appellee's garnishment under the Appellant's self
titled power of a de-facto receivership. The district court found in pertinent part:
...I agree with you that if they have a remedy for offset, they
have monies that they want to claim for themselves and for
their own debts, they can do that and I don't have any quarrel
with that because I think the law allows that... . R. 272 at page 4,
lines 23-25
...No, it didn't...I understand the bank's argument and I
understand the security agreement but I've dealt with this and that
means the bank has the right to take it off their debts, to offset
their loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that.
That's the difficulty that I have. That's not what they did. They
allowed it to be paid to other parties other than
themselves...they decided that could do this in this de-facto
receivership and that's what I'm saying, that's where I really have
problems with the law because there's nothing in the law that I'm
aware of that allows them to do that. R. 272 at page 6, lines 6-16.
... I have given Cache Bank [Appellant] now three hearings to
produce the evidence to show what they did...This is the third
hearing, special hearing that I have allowed Cache Bank...the
affidavit of the personfthe Bank president] is we created a defacto receivership, and so we control how or where this money
was spent and we allowed money to be sent to these third
parties in front of a valid garnishment for a valid
judgment...they [Cache Bank] made a determination that
instead of taking the money for themselves, they wanted the
money to go to other parties to pay their debts and move these
8

other parties' debts in front of a valid judgment with a
garnishment filed. They decided, we can do that. And I don't think
in the law they can do that. There is no where in the law I think they
can do that because that's not an offset. They're not offsetting.
They're allowing somebody else to get the money instead of
themselves. R. 272 at page 20, lines 1-19.
The Appellant has failed to understand the significance of the district
court's findings with regard to its rights. The district court did not find that
Appellee had a superior security interest. Rather the district court found that
while Appellant had a secured interest in the funds and had a right to offset the
funds of the judgment debtor, it failed to exercise those rights.
It is apparent from the record that the district court found that Appellant
had a security interest and had a right to offset funds when it received the
garnishment but chose not to protect itself by failing to exercising that right and
take monies for itself. The decision of the Appellant to not exercise its rights left
Appellee with the next "superior" security interest. However, Appellant allowed
third-parties to receive funds exceeding $42,000.00 under the self-proclaimed
power of de-facto receivership that should have gone to the Appellee by right of
its garnishment. The district court found that:
...they [Appellant] moved all these other people so the checks could
go out and pay them ahead of their own [Appellant], [and] ahead of
the garnishment that came in that I believe under the law had a
superior security interest. R. 9 at fl 4-7.
The district court was correct when it stated "they [Appellant] either had to
take them themselves or give them to somebody that had a higher security
interest" that being the Appellee. R. 9 at If 13-15.
9

Appellant also argues the district court made it pay the balance of the
judgment on the basis of a continuing garnishment. The Appellant is also in error
on this point. The record indicates that the district court was not treating it as a
continuing garnishment but rather ordering it to pay the balance of the judgment
as a penalty for contempt of the district court's garnishment order.
From the evidence submitted to the district court the record clearly
indicates, the Appellant was in violation of Rule 64D, the writ and the order of the
court. At the third evidentiary hearing held on April 2, 2007, the district court
found:
I'm going to make the following findings based on the evidence. It
appears that the date of the garnishment was November 1, 2006.
Following that the bank failed to provide an offset as required by
law, they didn't set the offset as required by law. And so when
we had the notice and the order to show cause they weren't in
compliance with the garnishment statute as required within
Rule 64, because they didn't provide notice within the required
time...they didn't provide that notice timely as required under the
garnishment statute. Even though they had notice of garnishment
and everything else, they didn't provide the notice that is required
under the garnishment statute that there was an offset...what they
did violated and was in contempt of the order of the Court. And
as a result they should be ordered to pay the amount of the
garnishment. R. 272 at page 22, lines 19-25, page 23, lines 1-8,
and page 24, lines 1-3.
Ultimately it was the failure of the Appellant to comply with the rule, the writ
and the order of the district court that functioned as the reason Appellant was
ordered to pay the balance of the judgment. The district court found this to be in
violation of rule 64D which states in pertinent part:

10

If a garnishee fails to comply with this rule [Rule 64D], the writ or an
order of the court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and
show cause why the garnishee should not be ordered to pay such
amounts as are just, including the value of the property or the
balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and reasonable costs
and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's
failure.
Despite the assertions of the Appellant, the district court recognized the
legal rights of Appellant but found the Appellant failed to exercise those legal
rights. In addition, the district court found that Appellant had allowed 27 checks
to clear through the bank account of the judgment debtor to pay other parties in
the amount of $42,412.48 after Appellant had received the garnishment. R. 272,
page 2 at 1J9-11, 16-17. It was based upon these actions that the Appellant was
found to be in contempt and properly ordered under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule
64D(j)(2) to pay the balance of the judgment as a penalty for contempt.
Accordingly, the Court should reject points 1 & 2 of Appellants' argument
and affirm the order of the district court.
III.

ANY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN SERVICE OF THE WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT BECAME MOOT WHEN APPELLANT FILED
ANSWERS TO GARNISHMENT INTERROGATORIES AND ENTERED
AN APPEARANCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL.
Appellant acknowledges before this Court in its opening brief that "once it

entered an appearance through its legal counsel it...waived, for purposes of the
future proceedings any previous defects in the service of process." See p. 41 of
Appellants' Opening Brief. The Court should affirm the district court on this
basis alone.
11

Appellant argues in its brief that its failure to assert is rights to claim an
offset, as required by Rule 64D(h), in answering the writ of garnishment
interrogatories should be excused for improper service of the writ of garnishment.
The failure of Appellant to assert a right to claim an offset is no one's fault but the
Appellant's. The Appellant was properly served with the writ of garnishment and
the record is devoid of any contention by Appellant following the second
evidentiary hearing (when the district court found service to be proper) that
proper service was an issue. Rule 64D(e) requires garnishee [Appellant] to
assert any rights, exemptions, claims or deductions against a debtor. The rule
further requires the garnishee [Appellant] assert those rights, exemptions, claims
or deductions in the answers to garnishment interrogatories within seven
business days and under oath or affirmation. Appellant timely answered the
garnishment interrogatories but failed to assert any rights to indebtedness,
exemptions, offset, or deductions against he judgment debtor as required by
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D.
Notwithstanding, Appellant is deemed to have been properly served with
the writ of garnishment when it timely filed answers to the garnishment
interrogatories and entered an appearance of legal counsel.

See Upper Blue

Bench Irr. Dist. v. Continental Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 1937, 93 Utah 325, 72 P.2d
1048 (The district court which is court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction of
garnishee bank, which entered appearance by filing answer in garnishment

12

proceeding by irrigation district's judgment creditor, even if writ served on bank
was impotent to require answer.)
Appall ml il ill H li- i ml 1
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any rights to offset. Appellant failed to exercise that privilege. Notwithstanding,
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certainly deals with garnishments or, a regular v:; r.jt caii

basii,. Appellant

certainly accepts and responds to garnishments on a frequent enough bases to
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The district court found .:•

.ant part u.cu.

...Garnishments and these kinds of things and liens are things that
happen all the time. I mean, it's seems quite incredible to me that
they don't understand the legal ramifications of this, and they create
something that in the law, I mean, they even have to call it the defacto receivership which means it's really not a legal one, it's just
one we've created of our own doing. R. 272 at page 11, lines 6-12.
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There is no prejudice because Appellant timely answered the garnishment
interrogatories. There is no relevant issue regarding service of the writ of
garnishment and there is no basis to permit Appellant to amend its answer to the
garnishment interrogatories to now claim a right to offset it clearly failed to assert
previously. Accordingly, the Court should reject point 4 of Appellants' argument
and affirm the order of the district court.
IV.

APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND ON APPEAL.
Appellee is entitled to its attorney fees and costs awarded by the district

court and on appeal because its action arises from Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides for an award of fees and costs for Appellant's
failure to comply with the rule [Rule 64D], the writ and the order of the district
court.
Appellee explicitly requests its attorney fees for this appeal. "A party
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). The legal basis for an award of attorney fees to Appellee arises from
Rule 64D(j)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Order to Show Cause
in re Contempt issued by the district court. R. 120-121. Specifically, "if a
garnishee [Appellant] fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the
court, the court may order the garnishee to pay such amounts as are just,
including the value of the property or the balance of the judgment, which ever is
14

less, and reasonable costs and attoriiey fees incurred by parties as a i est ilt of
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Accordingly, Appellee is entitled to its attorney fee- and costs awarded .r.^a.
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affirm the ordei of the district court.
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CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court should be affirmed and Appellee is
entitled to its attorney fees and costs awarded initially by the district court
together with those incurred on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20 th day of June, 2(
BABCOCK

ROBERT F. BABCQ0K
CODYW/WILSON
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20 day of June, 2008, a true and correct
(

ni ||n> tnn:;t)oiiiL| document was served by the method indicated

below, to the following:
•
•
•
D
D
•

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Certified Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Other:

N. George Daines (USB No 0803)
DAINES & WYATT
108 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321-4552
Telephone (435) 753-4000
Facsimile (435) 753-4002
Attorneys for Garnishee/Appellant
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1

THE COURT:

But the second one on November 1 they

2

said they entered into something called a defacto

3

receivership.

4

nowhere in the documents of any document that I have read

5

from the bank that I have gone through, do I have this

6

defacto receivership and I understand receivership in

7

bankruptcy, I understand receiverships but I don't know what

8

this defacto receivership is and let me tell you the biggest

9

issue I have with the bank.

Now nowhere under the law of garnishment or

There are, since the date of the

10

garnishment, 27 checks were allowed to be cleared through the

11

bank account.

12

through the bank and then one auto transfer debit, I assume

13

that was a debit card or something like that for $11,000.

So

14

there was a debit card allowed to clear through the bank.

To

15

me that would indicate that - and in that amount is

16

$42,412.48 from after they received the garnishment, they

17

allowed to be cleared and paid to other parties.

18

when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the

19

money on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another

20

party to receive a debt they have against this party and it

21

appears to me that the bank with this defacto receivership is

22

deciding as against a court order that these people have the

23

right to receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank,

24

because they're not taking the funds for themselves, I

25

understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're

One credit card payment was allowed to clear

I mean,

CI:) C ITM

d wn i tii i

.ji t "(jui i i , we' re taking the money to offset,

we m i n k there's a danger they' re not going to pay and they
ex^- ~ " -•

'

3i r t: hrtve ,-iny problem with doing that as 1

read the documents but 1 don't understand hou they can allow
themselves in this defarUi re< v- i i-( r s u i j \u
order and say these other people have
money instead oi uo, the os*~ *

•-

I mean, the person that garnished.

a

1 ' t

jyainst

a court

rignt to get the

••^•.-^-

th^ i n i n i k,liee ,

That's what I don't

understand under the law because I can't
llicji

i

find thdt

iii=iL in anywhere under the lawn,

oi icid

So that's an

issue I need to understand.
. u
and i n racr,

: r c u g n that.

What happened

about a year aoo -- when the bank's served

the first qa ni i slmi'Mii

nnl llio i>

i iKiudible) dropped, the

ball on that one (inaudible) garnishment and didn't exercise
the right

(inaudible) at C-t

:: ~ie.

Then in October 1 believe it was, don't know the
exact dattr , •' i "audible) served the s e c
* u-:'

.,-.,,-.

exercisec tnat remeo\ ana ::iey t:t --•=- it

off, rney drew \L

out the account and applied all the funds

they

tuwaids tlic loan a^d

urat ^ snown .:.:. our supplemental exhibit,
rr- . t is.
->~:\:r -

(

v

That :' ~

" •

^ ^ °an ^ee unere the lc-in .amount

top iu $46,300 arid inen aow:

Le^'s SP<= v^i^h
.

^:.L ^emordi

t aaain -* 'he

1

principle only payment on 11-17 for that amount, $17,000.

2

The bank did allow the debtors to do business but they

3

monitored - it was some time after the first punch list that

4

they began to monitor payments coming in and only allow

5

certain ones to go out.

6

THE COURT:

How could you allow certain to go out

7

if they have a garnishment that the court says comes before

8

the amount they allow to go out?

9

it to go out legally?

10

MR. JENSON:

11

The first garnishment would have

expired after 120 days.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JENSON:

I mean, how do they allow

That's under the rule.

Okay.
So after that time the bank, the bank

14

was (inaudible) total of three loans, couple hundred thousand

15

dollars together.

16

they wanted it to keep going.

17

THE COURT:

Okay, okay -

18

MR. JENSON:

So they -

19

THE COURT:

They didn't want to kill the business,

I understand what they did.

Legally

20

how can they do that?

21

cases, I read everything and there' s nothing in the law that

22

I can find that allows them to do that once they receive the

23

garnishment.

That's my question because I read the

I agree with you that if they have a remedy for

24 1 offset, they have monies that they want to claim for
25

themselves and for their own debts, they can do that and I
4

THE CO! J R T :

I I •, i It c i i di i t :.

that's exa c11y wha t I r m saying.

I t : allowed them -

The y a11owed a11 t hese

. i O M ^iastercharge re pay oft deSts ci other parties.
allowed t m s aeij_. * ~ • "

T: ey

* '.- • :

understand the bank'" s argument and I understand the security
aqreement but I've dealt with uiis an::
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• -- .

has the right to take it off the:- don ^, L ^ ;tfset .r.e^r
loans, to offset their payments i,uo **
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nave .
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T .\ -._' s n o f what they did.

"hey allowed ;i" ro be paid *c -^ber parties other than
- COUJ

.

.:- :: _y oeoioec

: do rh-S in tnis defacto rec-i ver.tnip ar-d that' 1

I m

r'

I

rn i I 11 11 '

n'l n i

I i ,il !

because there's nothing in the law thai

mat

w^ar

Li i rr ob 1 ^ ins Vg i I 1 '
I'm aware of that

allows them to do that.
MR

JEN SON:

T

f the bank, however,, is controlling

what ~ - na «d o^~ and why only so that the business can
"... a t goes t o the b a n k..
THE COURT:

What legal authority does it have to do

that n
K"

JENSOT T

Well, :i I ' s allowed to do that under

its securiuy a-T^em.---'
THE COURT:

No, there is no place in the security

agreement that it- says it can havo a defactn recei 1 'ership

1J*

I ,j

1

What it does is it says it can seize the account and it lists

2

the items that it can seize and take control of those items

3

and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute itself

4

for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say,

5

NN

You know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going

6

to allow your claim.

I'm going to move your claim ahead of

7

this claim because I think that's in my interest to move your

8

claim ahead of my claim."

9

here that I think is really unique under the law and I don't

I mean, they're taking on a role

10

think it's allowed, that's what I'm trying to ask.

11

understand the agreement and I understand the ability to

12

offset and I understand the ability for them to say, "You now

13

what, we don't think this is going to do that and we want to

14

take all your receivables out to pay our debt because we

15

don't you're going to be able to pay."

16

problem with that because that's what they agreed to and

17

that's what the parties agreed to but that's not what they

18

did, that's the part that I have the problem with because

19

that's not what they did.

20

MR. JENSON:

I mean, I

I don't have any

Okay, I can see that.

From my point

21

of view if the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling

22

how they're spent in furtherance of its own interests.

23

the bank is entitled to all of those funds and if they

24

release funds so they can be paid more in the future, that to

25

me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority to

If

tnat /ame

- j

In LdCt, iriey movec ,n. mer*: other people s: zh&

. L.

checks cvz

nere was enouar. nonev to pay - profec: * he

'

d go oui ana rav th-~^

•

*

the garnishment that came in tl: lat I believe under the law had
t* ^upenor security

n"*" °rest .

n:\n.

^a^ s^e that.

difference I see here i:-' 1 h^r

i "he n^nk had those funds in

< L a *-J
more -

The only

:.e: . _ iney coulu m.: paid

• •

they received tine garriisnment.

Tney either ha a \

themselves or give them 1M r,,nmpbcviy thnt had
security interest.

'^.e them

i IN IIM I

Tf they didn't want to protect their own

right- - and the people that allowed this "
:..

.ej ::.is was the bank and now what are they g c m g to

;• . Are they going to go tn al I I hese individuals and qet
it-'1',

^ "'I

:-ey' re not c o m a

I i iH

I In i

lii'i

l mean I know Cache Valley -

:o a.; :c ail these people that checks were

written arid LO

•.-•'.

3

money back.
vr.
,f

isition . ....

ip.NSC*
. .

\ 1 can s*

:.c mnus thai were received by the bank

after the date of garnishment, unless the bank put

I I I S

H

1

somebody else when there was a valid federal tax lien?" I

2

mean, it appears that they could come back against the bank

3

too.

4
5

'

MR. JENSON: True.

I see that as well.

THE COURT: I mean, I'm not - banks have

6

obligations.

Garnishments and these kinds of things and

7

liens are things that happen all the time.

8

seems quite incredible to me that they don't understand the

9

legal ramifications of this, and they create something that

I mean, it's

10

in the law, I mean, they even have to call it the defacto

11

receivership which means it's really not a legal one, it's

12

just one we've created of our own doing.

13

MR. JENSON: Right.

14

THE COURT: I mean, that word alone tells me-

15

MR. JENSON: Yeah, I mean, it wasn't the bank's -

16

the bank has a vested interest to see that the (inaudible), I

17

think, (inaudible) to the bank has a vested interested too.

18

The bank doesn't want to kill the business because they hope

19

to be repaid by (inaudible), whatever, plus thousands dollars

20

still owed.

21

certain debts were allowed to be paid but only because that

22

would allow business to continue to repay the bank.

23

don't know the specific details for each -

24
25

And so my understanding from the bank was that

Like - I

THE COURT: But do you see the difficulty that that
places with the Court because the bank then is substituting

THF a")npi • ' • '

{

\

;—

.

bdfiL now three

hearings to produce the evidence *a at- w what they did, that
the

inaudible).

•

liaciMay, special

hearing that I have allowed Cache Bank.
and the affidavit of the person '

-.

receivership, and so we centre1, L *

I mean, I'm not ---^
aaer-

-~~ " u s "•;• •

was

spent and we allowed money *^ n° sent to these *r
: ar: i£nni.o:r_ : :r a valid judgment,
mean, there's no question that thai 'a
..-"» •- -**

I

whether they did it

.- aniens to go through, they

ndo<=- :a aetermiaation that instead of taking -the mone> for
themselves, ih^y a

•

er parties to

pay their debts and move these other parties' debts in front
a v ~V) 1 d iudqment with a qarn i a] m< M, f filed, Th^y decided,
v. _ can do thai.
that.

And T don'1 think in the law they can do

There i a no where in the law 1 L:. • •

:: a u s >.-. 1. 11f 11 "" • i I d n otise t.

They're n ot o 11 s e r a J n q .

". aey ; re a.^c-wang somebody else to get the money instead m'
thems'. " • . • - - ' .
MR. JENSON: Weil, so, let's look at the facts,
well, I ^ L

:.ook at ;i t"
I
i..:..

/:

v"i \ \J! a a1.

COURT: It's nor a hypothetical,

!

his '.3 what

really happened.
h

.:.„.a..a. Tf the bank received funds front

deposits and aheia regained those, moved • K n<^

•-

20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

would continue.
THE

COURT: I'm not talking about hypotheticals.

I'm talking about what they did.
MR. JENSON:

Well, if in action that's what they

were doing, whether or not they took it out of that account.
THE COURT: No, no.
little bit tiresome, honestly.

Come on, this is getting a
I mean it is.

8

MR. JENSON: If you feel that, Your Honor, if you

9

feel that based on the evidence before you there is enough

10

there to say definitively that what the bank did was allow

11

the debtor to continue to pay these other creditors ahead of

12

the judgment creditor here, I can see the problem with that.

13

But if the bank was controlling those funds and only allowing

14

in its own best interest certain other creditors to be paid

15

so that the bank could continued to be paid, I don't see the

16

problem with that.

17

THE COURT: -well, okay, okay.

But the evidence-

18

MR. JENSON: (Inaudible).

19

THE COURT: I'm going to make the following findings

20

based on the evidence. It appears that the date of the

21

garnishment was November 1, 2006.

22

failed to provide an offset as required by law, they didn't

23 J set the offset as required by law.

Following that the bank

And so when we had the

24

notice and the order to show cause they weren't in compliance

25

with the garnishment statute as required within Rule 64,

22

because they didn't provide notice within the required time.
MR. JENSON: Other than appearing at the hearing and
showing the (inaudible) statement?
THE COURT: Yes, yes.

Yeah, but they didn't provide

that notice timely as required under the garnishment statute.
Even though they had notice of garnishment and everything
else, they didn't provide the notice that is required under
the garnishment statute that there was an offset.
In addition, they did take an offset it appears of
$17,000.

However, into that account after the garnishment

was a total of $41,789.52.

They didn't take any other

further offsets for themselves. The evidence that I have
before me would indicate that they allowed the judgment
debtor to continue to write checks and allow those checks to
clear the bank to pay third parties while that garnishment
was still in place, and was a valid garnishment still in
place, and that the funds that they allowed to go out was in
excess of the garnishment that was owed.

I mean, they took

their own money and there was still sufficient funds to pay
the garnishment ahead of these others.
this as a defacto receivership.

They have denoted

There is nothing in Rule 64

or in the Uniform Commercial Code or in any of the agreements
that I can see that would allow them to create this defacto
receivership that would allow them to do what they have done
in this case to circumvent a valid judgment and a valid

23

1

garnishment, and therefore, what they did violated and was in

2

contempt of the order of the Court.

3

should be ordered to pay the amount of the garnishment.

4
5
6

And as a result, they

MR. JENSON: If the bank were able to show that all
of the funds that were dispersed from the accountTHE COURT: Okay.

And I've been through it.

This

7

is the third opportunity that I've given the bank to present

8

evidence on its behalf.

9

been very open and very - and we've had three separate

And I have - and I think I've really

10

hearings scheduled to come in and say, "Bank, present what

11

evidence to show me that you have - that what you did

12 J complied with the law and its valid."

And I've received the

13

evidence and that the evidence that I've received would be

14

consistent with the findings that I have made.

15

this point, you know, I've entered the order and I guess if

16

they want to appeal the order I've entered they can.

17 I

And so, at

I'm going to ask to prepare findings and an order

18

consistent with my findings.

And if they believe the

19

evidence shows or establishes something different then - but

20

under the law, I don't see any other result. I'm not trying

21

to be arbitrary, I'm not trying to be anything.

22

MR. JENSON: No.

23

THE COURT: I'm just - because they're doing

24

something that I don't see anywhere in the law, and I've

25 J tried to research it, honestly, you know, is there such a

24

SECOND ADDENDUM TO BRIEF

ffi B

N. George Daines (0803)
DAINES & WYATT, LLP
108 North Main Street
Logan UT 84321-4552
Phone: (435) 753-4000
Fax: (435) 753-4002

KAR 1 ? 2007
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - FARMINGTON
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COLONIAL BUILDING SUPPLY,
LLC,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF GARNISHEE

vs.
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES,
INC. separately and dba as KRT
DRYWALL, BUD BAILEY
CONSTRUCTION, INC., LAYTON
POINTE, L.C., and JOHN DOES, 1
through 10,

Civil No. 050700267
District Judge: Jon M. Memmott

Defendants.
BUD BAILEY CONSTRUCTION,
INC.,
Cross-Claim and
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES,
INC. separately and dba as KRT
DRYWALL, Crosss-Claim Defendant;
and WILLIAM KIM PITCHER,

f Garnishee

Third Party Defendant.

050700267

CACHE VALLEY BANK, Garnishee

1

VD19514974
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES INC,DB>

STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache
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)

Gregg Miller, being first duly sworn and upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I am the President of Cache Valley Bank (hereinafter "Bank"), the Garnishee in these

proceedings.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts attested in this Affidavit and contained in the

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF GARNISHEE'S RESPONSE TO
GARNISHMENT and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN RE CONTEMPT, filed herewith.
3.

Sometime after the service upon Cache Valley Bank of the First Garnishment (April

24, 2006), the Bank management exercised its business judgment to allow remittance of the
garnishment amount, and soon thereafter, the Bank began to monitor and control all funds
owned by the Third-Party Defendant's on deposit at the Bank.
4.

In light of the perceived insolvency of the Third-Party Defendants, and their probable

inability to repay outstanding loan obligations, Bank management began operation of, more
or less, a receivership to allow deposits to be made into the bank accounts, with Bank
management control over all disbursements made from the accounts.
5.

Throughout the de-facto receivership, the Bank has only allowed certain

disbursements to be made that would allow Third-Party Defendant to continue business
operations in a way that would allow for the repayment of loans to the Bank.

2

6.

In establishing the de-facto receivership, the Bank management exercised its business

judgment to protect the Bank's secured interests in the funds held in the bank accounts, as
well as the Bank's secured interests in the business and property of Third-Party Defendants
(including accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, etc., in which the Bank also holds
secured interests).
7.

When the Second Garnishment was served on the Bank (on or about October 19,

2006), all funds held by the Bank in the Third-Party Defendants' bank accounts were
removed, and the accounts were left with zero balance remaining. (See attached Exhibit
"A", containing bank account statements)
8.

Subsequent to service of the Second Garnishment, the Bank management has

continued to monitor and control the bank accounts, as well as monitor the business activities
and accounts receivable of the Third-Party Defendants, all in an attempt to recover more
amounts owed to the bank from outstanding loan obligations.
9.

Currently, the business of Third-Party Defendants is in a basic state of liquidation.

10.

The Bank claims a perfected security interest in all assets of Third-Party Defendants,

to the exclusion of all other creditors—including Third-Party Plaintiffs named herein.

Affiant, being first duly sworn and under oath, states that he has read this document and
understands it; the facts set forth are true. Further, Affiant saith naught.

3

DATED this 12th day of March, 2007

*-i0£

w:

;egg Mille

^

Merit, Cache Valley Bank

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO in the County of Cache, State of Utah, on this / ^ d a y
of March, 2007, Gregg Miller, President of Cache Valley Bank, appeared before me, the
undersigned Notary Public, and acknowledged to me that he signed this Affidavit voluntarily
for its stated purpose, and the facts stated therein are true.
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^

SHARON M. NIELSON
Notary Public
State of Utah
My Commission Expires May 1,2009 Ir
199 N. Main, Logan UT 84321

r
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NOTARY PUBLIC
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